The theme of this conference volume is domination and global political justice in its multiple possible dimensions. So I want to begin with a striking global analysis from less than a century ago, from the 1920s. I will conceal for the moment the author’s identity, except to say that he is a well-known historical figure. See if you can guess who it is before you turn the page:

Of the billion and a half people in the world, the most powerful are the 400 million whites on the European and American continents; from this base the white races have started out to swallow up other races. The American red aborigines are gone, the African blacks will soon be exterminated, the brown race of India is in the process of dissolution, the yellow races of Asia are now being subjected to the white man’s oppression and may, before long, be wiped out. But the 150 million Russians, when their revolution succeeded, broke with the other white races and condemned the white man’s imperialistic behaviour; now they are thinking of throwing in their lot with the weaker, smaller peoples of Asia in a struggle against the tyrannical races. So only 250 million of the tyrannical races are left, but they are still trying by inhuman methods and military force to subjugate the other 1,250 million. So hereafter mankind will be divided into two camps: on one hand will be the 1,250 million; on the other side, the 250 million. . . .

Now we want to revive [‘s] lost nationalism and use the strength of our [ ] millions to fight for mankind against injustice; this is our divine mission. The Powers are afraid that we will have such thoughts and are setting forth a specious doctrine. They are now advocating cosmopolitanism to inflame us, declaring that, as the civilization of the world advances and as mankind’s vision enlarges, nationalism becomes too narrow, unsuited to the present age, and hence that we should espouse cosmopolitanism. In recent years some of [‘s] youth, devotees of the new culture, have been opposing nationalism, led astray by this doctrine. But it is not a doctrine which wronged races should talk about. We, the wronged races, must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism.

For a contemporary readership, especially one unfamiliar with the history of colonialism and anti-colonial struggles, this passage will, I suggest, be quite startling in its matter-of-factly
racialist framework of analysis. The author takes for granted, in a way that clearly indicates he does not see it as likely to be controversial for his audience, that he and his readers are living in a world characterized by white racial domination and exterminist policy. Whites dominate the planet and are seeking to extend their rule indefinitely, if necessary through the genocide of the remaining races. (The reference to Africa is probably to the depredations of King Leopold II in the Belgian Congo from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, largely forgotten in the West until Adam Hochschild’s *King Leopold’s Ghost* refreshed official memory fifteen years ago. Hochschild estimates the death toll under the regime at about ten million people.) So white supremacy is global and a united transnational struggle of the nonwhite races against it is necessary for their survival. Races are not at all merely abstract sociological categories, but active social agents.

The editor of the collection from which I took this excerpt characterizes the author’s views as “Social Darwinist.” But if Social Darwinism is committed to natural racial hierarchy, unavoidable interracial struggle, a biologistic dynamic, and the evolutionary goal of the triumph of the “superior” races, this judgment (at least on the basis of the passage here) seems to me to be questionable. The author’s interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution as constituting a massive white defection from the ranks of the “tyrannical races”—politically naïve as it may appear to us a century later—shows that what is presumed to be at work is not an ineluctable, biologically driven racial determinism. Options are open and moral and political choice is possible. A class-based Marxism is clearly not taken to be incongruent with a “racial” struggle against global white supremacy; whites may change sides (becoming, in a contemporary vocabulary, “race traitors”) and adopt a politics of anti-imperialism instead of a politics of conquest. Note also that this resistance is not being represented as the struggle to achieve a racial dictatorship of
nonwhites over their oppressors, nor to prosecute a retaliatory exterminism. Rather, what is being sought is global justice for the “wronged races” of “mankind,” a mission with divine sanction. In the writer’s opinion, however, it would be a mistake at this stage to endorse a cosmopolitan ideal. Instead, a racial nationalism to restore the “freedom and equality” of the author’s oppressed co-nationals is what is called for. Only after that has been achieved will it be appropriate to discuss the issue of cosmopolitanism.

I want to use this passage, with all its obvious problems, as a stalking horse to challenge the conventional frameworks in which global domination and global justice are discussed. (The author, I will now reveal, is Sun Yat-sen, standardly viewed as “the father of modern China”; the population figure, which I omitted since it would have given the game away, was 400 million. You might have guessed Marcus Garvey, though imminent African extinction would certainly not have been so off-handedly mentioned by him.) For what it does is bring home both how routinely racial categories were employed in the analysis of European colonial domination only a few decades ago, and how absent they are today from contemporary debates on the problems of globalization.

The philosophical literature on global justice has dramatically expanded in recent years, a manifestation both of the contraction of the planet through ease of communication and travel (so that the longtime cliché of the global village is on the verge of literal realization) and the worsening in many respects of issues of poverty and relative underdevelopment. What might once have been the subject of an occasional article in the conscientious editor’s ethics anthology is now routinely the exclusive topic of entire courses. But though a wide range of normative approaches (modified Rawlsian, egalitarian, sufficientarian, cosmopolitan) will typically be canvassed in such readings, a commonality of this literature is the virtual absence of any
discussion of race and racism. For those from the former Third World (such as myself) familiar with any of the anti-colonial writings of the 19th and 20th centuries, this silence is remarkable, since the global injustice of imperialism and colonialism was classically seen (as the Sun Yat-sen excerpt makes clear) precisely as a matter of white domination over people of color. This racial dimension was not at all taken to be a merely contingent correlation, accidental and theoretically irrelevant, but causally central and deeply consequential.

Consider the black radical political tradition, which, though it has sometimes degenerated into chauvinism and racism, has at its best been both internationalist and anti-racist, seeking racial equality rather than racial revenge, and advocating a global elimination of racial hierarchy and privilege. Here we can find former slave Quobna Cugoano condemning in 1787 the “Christian nations” not merely for their enslavement of Africans but also for their treatment of “the various Indian nations,” thereby violating “the universal natural rights and privileges of all men,” among whom “there are no inferior species, but all of one blood and of one nature”; David Walker directing his 1829 Appeal not just to his fellow black Americans but to “the coloured citizens of the world”; Pan-Africanist Martin Delany complaining in 1852 that though “there are two colored persons for each White man in the world . . . the White race dominates the colored”; W.E.B. Du Bois describing at the 1900 Pan-African Conference the global problem of “the color line, the question as to how far differences of race . . . are going to be made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization,” and in his famous 1903 The Souls of Black Folk predicting that “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line, the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea”; a judgment still being echoed more than half a century later by Frantz Fanon’s 1961 The Wretched
of the Earth: “It is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race.”

Admittedly, because blacks had to suffer racial slavery and its stigmatizing legacy as well as colonization, and because anti-black racism has historically been more virulent and more systematically and elaborately developed than any of the other varieties of colonial white racism (as against anti-Semitism), racial theorization has been more salient here than in any other anti-colonial/anti-imperialist tradition. A forced black diaspora, largely to the Americas but also to Europe, generated an oppositional body of political theory for which race was the central organizing prism. But it was not at all unique for the period, which is why I made a point of beginning with the Chinese nationalist rather than a black writer. The question then is whether it is worth trying to recuperate the insights of such a racially-informed internationalism in a contemporary context. Would the formal thematic introduction of race add anything of value to the current debate, if so how, and by what means do we successfully negotiate the various conceptual and methodological hurdles on such a path?

1. Race (and Whiteness) as a Global Institution

The natural starting-point is a clarification of the racial metaphysics presupposed by this framework. While skeptics may concede that racism was central to the ideological rationale for imperialism and colonialism, this concession will not generally be intended to imply the same for race. One is ideational, the other material. The understandable fear is that this vocabulary, this kind of discourse, cannot in fact be retrieved without a resurrection of Social Darwinist assumptions, or something similarly dubious. After all, it will be pointed out, it is no accident that these terms have disappeared from mainstream theory. Why try to revive a language which is surely no more than an “oppositional” version of classic racial theory, an “anti-racist racism”
in Sartre’s famous characterization of Negritude—motivationally perhaps perfectly understandable, but theoretically obviously deeply problematic, a stage to be sublated and transcended? Moreover, how in any case could this vocabulary be applied on a global scale? So a series of refutations is constructed, what could be seen as concentric fallback positions: either race does not exist at all; or it does not exist globally; or it does not exist in the way necessary to sustain any generalizations and theorizations, descriptive and normative, of the desired kind.

Consider the first claim. In the (small) philosophical circles where race is discussed, the key umbrella metaphysical positions are eliminativism and anti-eliminativism. Eliminativists, as the word implies, want to eliminate “race” from our vocabulary, as a non-referring term like “witch” or “phlogiston.” They argue that science has disproved the reality of race and we should stop using a concept that is not only evidentially discredited, but one that has caused great harm historically. Anti-eliminativists disagree. Some contend that there is by no means a scientific consensus yet, and that research in forensic anthropology and medical biology shows that we need to retain the concept, even if we reject the idea of racial hierarchy that is, of course, its most famous and pernicious accompaniment. So for them reports of the demise of the concept of biological race are greatly exaggerated. However, the most important version of anti-eliminativism agrees with eliminativism that race does not exist biologically, but insists that it exists as a social construct. So from this perspective, we need to retain the term to track social realities, both descriptive/explanatory (how particular social groups, “races,” come into being and how a racialized society then works) and normative (issues of racial injustice).

In this framework, to say that race is constructed means that it is brought into existence as a social convention established by social mores, legal decisions, opportunity structures, discriminatory practices, the internalization of the racial norms and concepts accompanying these
institutions and processes, and the corresponding habits of self- and other-categorization
developed in everyday cognition and everyday interaction. As this listing should have made
clear, such a reconceptualization of race is quite anti-biologistic in its assumptions, so that it
would be denied that the specter of classic racial theory is necessarily invoked by it. Indeed, the
point of the “critical” in “critical race theory,” apart from linking it with “critical theory” in the
left tradition, is in part precisely to distinguish it from classic “[uncritical] race theory,” which
usually just meant racist theory. So critical race theory is explicitly anti-racist in its mission and
in its assumptions, and should not at all be seen as potentially assimilable to a nonwhite version
of Rassenwissenschaft.

Now, for the past few hundred years, whiteness has been the central racial category—the
normative reference point, the default mode. This is illustrated by the simple fact that it comes
“naturally” to us (a social naturalness, to be sure) to speak of whites and nonwhites, and not, say,
of blacks and nonblacks, or to speak of whites and people of color, and not, say, of people of
color and people of noncolor. But whiteness is not natural, but, as with race in general, a social
construct: hence such literature of recent years as The History of White People, The Invention of
the White Race, Whiteness of a Different Color, How the Irish Became White, How Jews Became
White Folks and What That Says about Race in America, White on Arrival, White by Law, and
many others. These books make it clear that whiteness as a social category is invented (it did
not exist in the pre-modern world) and its boundaries and content are conventionally determined.
But this invention does not mean that it is not real; it is quite real in its social effects of
privileging whites, disadvantaging people of color, shaping social opportunities, affecting public
policy, determining life chances, impacting how nominally inclusive rights and freedoms are
actually differentially operationalized, structuring moral consciousness and one’s sense of
identity, and so forth. As such, race could be seen not merely as an institution, but as an institution so important that it would arguably count as part of John Rawls’s “basic structure” in its multi-dimensional social impact on the modern state.\textsuperscript{12} The modern state in general, as David Theo Goldberg contends—and certainly the U.S. state—is in fact a racial state.\textsuperscript{13}

So that would be the first hurdle cleared. The second is the objection that even if race is real, it could not be global in the appropriate way. After all, the texts above are all American, written by Americans and referring primarily to the United States. Michael Root has famously said that “Race does not travel.” If race is a social construct, an artifact of convention, then surely there is going to be variation in the construction and the conventions from nation to nation, including the possibility that in some countries race will not exist at all. I am classified as black in the United States, for example, and duly fill in the appropriate box on bureaucratic forms, thereby counting as “African-American” for the census and Northwestern University’s faculty statistics. But in my native Jamaica, I count as “brown” rather than black, not being dark enough, and as such I am fitted into the middle stratum of what was once, post-Emancipation, a three-tiered pyramid (white/brown/black).\textsuperscript{14} So could it not be argued that even if race is global (and there might be exceptions), it is a global patchwork of diverse and competing local systems rather than a planetarily uniform set of norms? And as such, it would be claimed, it can’t play the kind of role this analysis is trying to impute to it.

But though Root’s aphorism does capture a constructionist truth, the reality of national variation, it is misleading insofar as it implies that there are no overarching commonalities. In both Jamaica and the United States, I will still be categorized as a person of color, someone not white, and as such on the “wrong” side of what is the central and most important global racial divide. And though the borders of whiteness vary, white is a transnational category for the
simple reason that it is established by European expansionism—European imperialism and European colonialism. As Howard Winant writes, the result of this process is an “immense planetary metamorphosis” that leads to the creation of a “world racial system.”\(^{15}\) So while some people counted as white in some countries will not count as (fully?) white in others,\(^{16}\) it is generally the case across the planet that Europeans and their descendants are dominant, and that there is a “core” (roughly, northwestern Europeans) whiteness of people who are counted as whites pretty well everywhere. Recently, theorists have begun trying to extend critical race theory beyond U.S. borders—see, for example, the British sociologist Steve Garner’s *Whiteness: An Introduction*\(^{17}\)—and as the body of such literature expands, we may expect more detailed and fine-grained case studies of race and whiteness across the world that both address such variations and point out the commonalities.

Finally, to the objection that a global whiteness, even if it existed, could have no explanatory power, bear in mind that in the modern period this category becomes, as emphasized, one of the most central markers of social privilege. It is a matter neither of an accidental and causally otiose correlation, like foot size, nor of a biologically-driven *Rassenkampf*, with all the unhappy historical associations such a term will evoke. It is a matter of people being categorized in a certain way, internalizing that categorization, growing up in a world structured around such categories, and leading lives in the light of that ascribed empowering identity (with its distinctive motivational and belief sets).

In my own work, I have used the phrase “global white supremacy,” which to many will seem like a clearly extremist and indefensible concept.\(^{18}\) But imagine we jump in the time machine and set the controls for a trip of a century backward. Emerging in early 1914, what will we find? We will find a world on the eve of World War I, which is completely dominated by the
colonial empires: British, French, Dutch, Belgian, German, Portuguese, Russian. By Edward Said’s estimate, 85 percent of the earth at the time is under some kind of control by the European powers, white European nations ruling over nonwhite nations.¹⁹ (China is not formally colonized, but it is under European hegemony.) Moreover, in independent countries like the white settler states—the U.S., Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand—it is again whites who are the dominant group, with widespread formal and informal discrimination against aboriginal peoples and (where they exist) the descendants of black slaves being the norm. In the Latin American nations which gained their independence in the nineteenth century, whites and the light-skinned are, contra the myths of “racial democracy” and an all-inclusive mestizaje, economically, socially, politically, and culturally privileged over the darker and the indigenous.²⁰

In sum, across most of the globe, whites are the rulers, both internationally and nationally. The few independent nations of color—black nations like Haiti and Ethiopia, the Asian nation of Japan—all have to operate within a white-dominated world, and are all constrained by its norms and power relationships.

None of these facts is novel; they can be found in any objective history book. What is lacking is the theoretical will to recognize their implications, the refusal to put them together into a composite picture. It might also be objected that “global white supremacy” implies a single coordinating and governing body, say a White House that is not American but globally empowered and authoritative. But a planet dominated by sub-planetary political entities that are themselves white-rulled is still, though polycentric, white-rulled overall, even if there is no white world state as such. For though there is no centralized planetary seat of formal white governing power, though whites the world over are divided by national membership, citizens of countries sometimes in conflict with each other, and internally divided by class and gender, there are
nonetheless binding trans-oceanic and trans-social links. Racial ideologies circulate globally, assumptions of nonwhite inferiority and the legitimacy of white rule are taken for granted, a shared colonial history of pacts, treaties, international jurisprudence and a racia-religious self-conception of being the bearers and preservers of civilization provide common norms and reference points. Across the world, whites coordinate and share information on particular racial issues and follow prescriptions of international law predicated on differential white entitlements. So their “whiteness” is not at all causally irrelevant, but shapes their conception of themselves and others, their view of their group interests, their collective and individual identities, the political and moral framework within which they understand the world. As Branwen Gruffydd Jones comments: “The belief in a hierarchy of peoples—in the superiority of Europeans or people with European ancestry and the inferiority of non-Europeans or ‘people of color’—was widespread and routine, a generally unquestioned assumption embedded both in the public and personal European imagination and in the formal institutions of European and international order.”21

So I would suggest that the concept implicit or explicit in the excerpts cited at the start from Sun Yat-sen, Walker, Delaney, Du Bois, and Fanon—the concept of a white supremacy that is global— which when first encountered may seem obviously problematic, is actually theoretically quite defensible. And in fact it is now being used by some historians to characterize the period. Thus historian Martin Borstelmann refers to “the era of global white supremacy,” “the international character of white rule over people of color”: “Continuing differences in the racial distribution of power and wealth confirm the ongoing relevance of this theme to contemporary international history.”22 Similarly, two Australian historians, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, have published a book whose title pays tribute to Du Bois: Drawing the Global
"Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality. They describe “the spread of ‘whiteness’ as a transnational form of racial identification,” “the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self,” and comment critically on Benedict Anderson’s well-known *Imagined Communities*: “Paradoxically, one outcome of Anderson’s argument has been to naturalize the nation as the imagined community of modern times, an effect that has obscured the ascendancy of transnational racial identifications and their potency in shaping both personal identity and global politics.”

Likewise, one chapter of the Italian philosopher Domenico Losurdo’s recently translated *Liberalism: A Counter-History* is titled “The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale.”

In effect, then, these contemporary scholars are recovering a concept that was quite obvious and uncontroversial to theorists and activists of color of the period, but which seems strange to us now because of the efficiency of the postwar West’s erasure of the centrality of race to its rule. Writing specifically about the “Anglosphere” (which for me would be a sub-system, even if the most important one, of the larger global racial system), Srdjan Vucetic points out that “In an effort to forget its racist past, IR [international relations] turned race into a ‘taboo’.” But the reality is that “the origins of [the] Anglosphere are racial,” “a hierarchy made up of the core and mostly white Self on the one hand and on the other the peripheral and overwhelmingly nonwhite Other.”

Similarly, Sankaran Krishna argues that “the discipline of International Relations (IR) was and is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, a willful amnesia, on the question of race.” Embarrassed both by the death camps’ demonstration of where the logic of racism leads—even Europeans could be subjected to mass murder—and by a colonial discourse no longer appropriate for a post-colonial world (if only nominally), the West has sought to white-out the multiple ways race and racial ideology underpinned its global
domination. But we need to recover this past both so as better to understand it and to enable us to
dismantle the legacy it has left behind. Suitably reconceptualized, race is necessary for such a
revisionist theorization and intended egalitarian transformation.

2. Liberalism and Race

Facing rather than evading this history thus requires that we confront how liberalism has
been shaped by race. For with the seeming demise of Marxism, liberalism is now the globally
dominant ideology. As such, it constitutes an ethico-juridical set of concepts, norms and
principles, underlying assumptions and overarching narratives, which will necessarily be a
central reference-point for debate, whether as an accepted framework or one to be challenged,
modified, and built upon. And at least until recent decades, liberalism has sanitized its racial
past. Even now, the accounts standardly given in political philosophy textbooks and
encyclopedia summaries are whitewashed versions of the reality. (I emphasize political
philosophy because far greater progress has been made in political theory.) These accounts
usually center on Europe and focus on the white male population, telling an inspirational Whig
narrative of the triumph of moral egalitarianism over ascriptive hierarchy, of John Locke’s
victory over Sir Robert Filmer. But once this tale is set in a global context, and the focus
broadened to include white women and people of color (i.e., the majority of the world’s
population), it will be appreciated that the actual story is very different. As Duncan Ivison, Paul
Patton and Will Sanders pointed out more than a decade ago:

Contemporary political theory has much to learn from the encounter with its colonial past. . . . [D]ifferent strands of western political thought have not only been complicit with, but helped to justify, colonial expansion and imperial control over indigenous peoples and their territories. As much as modern political theory, especially in its liberal and social democratic variants, has emphasized universal human rights, equality before the law and individual and collective freedom, it has also explicitly denied such
entitlements to indigenous peoples. . . As a result, egalitarian political theory has often ended up justifying explicitly inegalitarian institutions and practices.28

And race has provided the theoretical and normative rationale for reconciling egalitarianism and inegalitarianism, differentiating the human population into those deserving and those undeserving of equal treatment. In such works as Barbara Arneil’s *John Locke and America*, Uday Singh Mehta’s *Liberalism and Empire*, Jennifer Pitts’s *A Turn to Empire*, James Tully’s *Imperialism and Civic Freedom*, Thomas McCarthy’s *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, John Hobson’s *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, and others, we have traced for us the contours of what Pitts usefully calls an “imperial liberalism,” in which it is not merely that pejorative characterizations of Native Americans and Native Australians, Africans and Asians, are routine, but in which the key concepts of liberalism as a theory are shaped by this imperial logic.29 The latter is, of course, the really interesting theoretical point, since obviously contemporary white liberals will be emphatic about their repudiation of any demeaning representations of non-European peoples to be found in the tradition’s classic writings. But the question is whether such excisions are sufficient to address possibly deeper structural biases in terms of crucial assumptions, framings, norms, and narratives. If liberalism is to be salvaged, if we want to develop an anti-imperial liberalism, such as Pitts claims can be found in many theorists in the tradition before the development of empire, an *Enlightenment against Empire*,30 in Sankar Muthu’s titular phrase, how can this best be done? In political theory, as noted above, there is already a significant body of work seeking to address this question by engaging nuts-and-bolts issues of constitutional reform and indigenous autonomy. But what might the distinctive contribution at the more abstract level of political philosophy be, in terms of the kind of descriptive and normative theory that is its specialization?
I suggest that the feminist example on gender could be illuminating as a model to be followed for race. Second-wave feminist philosophers, faced with the task of advancing a feminist agenda in a theoretical and conceptual universe dominated by male frameworks, took various approaches. One was to repudiate liberalism (and Marxism, at a time when Marxism was still seen as a viable contender) in the name of a distinctive, radically new theory that (putatively) owed nothing to “masculinist” thought in any form. But another approach was to argue that liberalism’s key assumptions and values were not intrinsically problematic, but needed to be rethought in the light of its sexist exclusions. So as Susan Moller Okin pointed out long ago, it was not just a matter of conscientiously using “person” or sometimes even “woman” as the generic human representative, but of reconceptualizing the theory from the ground up. One asked oneself the question: how, counterfactually, would liberalism have developed had its leading thinkers not taken female subordination for granted? What kind of liberalism would one get if the public/private divide had not been drawn in such a way as to exclude women from political life and social justice? How would a theory nominally predicated on the need to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all individuals have to be reconstructed if half of those individuals had not been positioned, by virtue of their sex, as superior to the other half, and had this not been embedded in conceptual framings, normative orientation, value development?

So rather than regarding this body of thought as liberalism simpliciter, one framed it self-consciously as patriarchal liberalism, and then tried to go beyond its epistemic horizon, in keeping with the critical theory tradition (originally applied just to class society), that the ideological effects of systems of domination are best analyzed and corrected for by reconstructing how the material functioning of the system produces and reproduces them. Thomas McCarthy writes in general of critical theory’s strategy that it
contains elements of immanent, transcendent, and genealogical critique: “immanent” in that it starts from values, ideas, and principles embedded in the cultures and societies it analyzes; (context-) “transcendent” in that it reconstructs these values, ideals, and principles in terms of a general, discourse-ethical account of practical reasoning; and “genealogical” in that it is self-reflectively metacritical of the historical and contemporary forms of existing reason that it seeks to reconstruct as critical resources.  

The key point, then, is that one examines hegemonic concepts and norms from a critical perspective predicated on the assumption that they will have been shaped by social domination, and so need either to be reconstructed in more acceptable forms, or rejected outright, by the standards of the superior social mapping and egalitarian norms of an order without such domination. Class society and class theory historically played this role for Marxism and subsequent critical theory; patriarchy and gender theory have more recently played this role for feminism. And what I am suggesting is that global white supremacy and critical race theory can and should play a similar role for anti-racism. Pitts’s “imperial liberalism” can, I suggest, be more broadly formulated as “racial liberalism” (thereby conceptually uniting inter- and intra-national racial domination). Reconceptualizing liberalism this way would, I believe, have several virtues:

(i) It would make clear what I have suggested has tended to be buried in postwar political philosophy, the intimate historical connection between liberalism and race. The study of the racial shaping of the thought of many, if not most, of the central figures of the modern Western canon could thus become a legitimate research area within the field rather than an offhand concession marginalized to the realm (if that much) of occasional footnotes. We would then have a more comprehensive and holistic picture of the tradition, one not sanitized for reasons of political expediency. In addition, it would highlight the link between imperial expansion and the creation of racial polities both in the former First World and the former Third World nations,
pre-empting the psychologizing of racism which has been the liberal norm since the aftermath of World War II. Continuing racial subordination would be conceptualized, as it should be, as a matter of political economy, with racism as its ideology. Whether as one strain of (in Rogers Smith’s formulation\(^\text{35}\) “multiple traditions” in American national political culture (and elsewhere too, I would claim) or as “symbiotic” with liberalism (my own preferred analysis), racial discourse would be given the theoretical centrality to moral and political philosophy it deserves.

(ii) Correspondingly, it would open the conceptual door for the admission to the canon of thinkers in the black, anti-colonial, and Third World traditions of political philosophy, whose central focus historically was, of course, white racism and European domination. In other words, the construction of “Western” political philosophy as raceless has the ideological consequence not merely of misrepresenting its own actual past, but of erecting a convenient \textit{cordon sanitaire} between it and the oppositional anti-racist tradition of people of color. A political theorist of the stature of W.E.B. Du Bois, for example, can be excluded from the canon because his work is preoccupied with the issue of racial subordination and how to overcome it. And since racial subordination is not recognized as political (or even as existent), his writings—“Afro-modern political thought”\(^\text{36}\)—cannot be political philosophy. Thus we get the absurd situation of a white tradition representing itself as colorless and separate from the black tradition when it is \textit{precisely because of its exclusionary racist whiteness} that the oppositional black tradition has had to come into existence in the first place! And given the planetary reach of the West, a case can obviously be made that globalization \textit{avant la lettre} suggests the need for a redrawing of how the political thought of the nationals of non-Western nations should be categorized also, when we seek to demarcate the boundaries of “Western” political philosophy.
(iii) Finally, it would help to end the ghettoization of contemporary political philosophers who work on race, who are currently regarded as pursuing an idiosyncratic agenda, marginal to the mainstream of the profession. Critical philosophy of race would not be viewed as a field unto itself, a self-created intellectual ghetto sharply conceptually separated from both the (by implication raceless) mainstream political philosophy literature and the global justice literature, but as offering a distinct perspective on that subject matter that needs to be engaged with. Through such a desegregation of intellectual worlds—a desegregation of both key thinkers and key themes—the conceptual space would then be opened up for a rethinking of descriptive and normative political philosophy in the light of this unacknowledged history: Locke’s self-owning appropriators confronted with the non-self-owning Frederick Douglass; Kant’s cosmopolitanism in critical dialogue with Edward Said’s; Hegel’s World-Spirit challenged by Du Bois’s indictment of global whiteness. Personhood, rights, freedoms, democracy, recognition, autonomy, property, self-ownership, respect for self and others, civilization, the nation-state, the social contract, the ambit of justice—how might all of these have to be rethought once the history of imperialism and colonialism is taken into account, and its influence on the shaping of all of these concepts made the subject of philosophical investigation?

3. Race and the Rethinking of Justice

Let us turn now to justice, and racial justice. There is a remarkable disjuncture—indeed a chasm—between the professional literature on justice produced by philosophers and the popular discussions of the subject, both in the United States, and—at least historically (as pointed out in my opening pages)—globally. Racial justice is one of the main banners under which the American civil rights movement and to a significant extent the global anti-colonial movement (which Martin Borstelmann characterizes as “the international civil rights movement”37)
marched. Yet in the tremendous revival of Anglo-American political philosophy over the past 40 years stimulated by John Rawls’s 1971 *A Theory of Justice*, it is a phrase and a topic that is virtually completely absent. Whether directed at national or planetary justice, this huge body of work has almost nothing to say about racial justice. In such authoritative reference works of the last decade as Samuel Freeman’s edited *Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (2003), his own exhaustively expository *Rawls* (2007), Jon Mandle’s *Rawls’s A Theory of Justice: An Introduction* (2009), Percy B. Lehning’s *John Rawls: An Introduction* (2009), and Sebastiano Maffetone’s *Rawls: An Introduction* (2010), for example, one finds at best isolated sentences or paragraphs referring to racial discrimination, never any detailed exploration of its implications for racial justice.38

What explains this silence? In my opinion, a confluence of factors is at work. First, there is the demographic whiteness of the profession: about 98 percent in the United States. Insofar as, even within a subject as abstract as philosophy, group experience and group privilege play a role in influencing concerns and interests, we would expect that those who have historically been the beneficiaries of racial injustice would tend to have less interest in exploring the topic than those who have been its victims. (Again, the feminist analogy is illuminating: compare the non-discussion of gender justice as a topic in philosophy before the relative influx of women into the profession from the 1970s onward.) Second, there is the whiteness of the tradition itself—the fact that race has not generally been an issue critically examined within white philosophy (as against uncritically endorsed in racist statements by white philosophers39). Third, as mentioned at the start, it might be felt (now) that race is not really a respectable category, and that racial justice can be subsumed into other kinds of justice, so that in any case it is really redundant. Fourth, we have the problem—not peculiar to philosophy, but exacerbated here because of its disciplinary
abstraction away from the empirical—of the general sanitization of the racist historical record, at least until comparatively recently, by the academies of the European colonial powers and their offshoots, such as the United States. With a few honorable exceptions, it has been a history of whitewash—a past of racial atrocity now embarrassing, that needs to be denied or downplayed. Finally, I would suggest that the overwhelming orientation of the field towards what Rawls famously called “ideal theory,” the theory of distributive justice appropriate for a “perfectly just society,” has itself been a major contributor to this outcome. Not only did it postpone matters of non-ideal theory, pre-eminently matters of compensatory justice, to such time (ever-receding over the horizon) as ideal theory would have been properly worked out, but it marginalized as a peripheral concern the historically accurate mapping of the past with which compensatory justice is definitionally concerned. Ideal theory would turn out to have deleterious effects not merely normatively but, as Onora O’Neill has pointed out, descriptively, in terms of the conceptualizations typically deployed of society and the polity, which have generally abstracted away from real-life, non-ideal structures of oppression.⁴⁰

How do we redress this situation? In her recent *Scales of Justice*, Nancy Fraser argues that the “framing” of justice needs to be self-consciously rethought in a world where “transnational social movements contest the national frame within which justice conflicts have historically been situated and seek to re-map the bounds of justice on a broader scale,” one that challenges “the Westphalian mapping of political space,” that is, “political communities as geographically bounded units, demarcated by sharply drawn borders and arrayed side by side.”⁴¹ As indicated at the start of the essay, such a mapping was always put into question by the international anti-colonial movement, which saw European domination and white racial hegemony as global. More recently, the question of what justice demands to repair the legacy of
the colonial history has explicitly been raised by nations of the Global South. The marginality of such concerns in the mainstream justice literature can illuminatingly be thought of as manifestations of a particular frame, what Joe Feagin calls the “white racial frame,” which has been so influential in shaping white cognition over the past few hundred years that even normative theory is affected by it.\(^4\) As feminist liberals trying to reclaim rather than repudiate liberalism have sought to rethink patriarchal liberalism so as to purge it of a masculinist bias that runs far deeper than overtly stigmatizing representations of women, so, I would suggest, we need to rethink imperial liberalism, racial liberalism, so as to eliminate its distinctive white bias.

(i) The first step, in my opinion, should be explicitly to shift from ideal to non-ideal theory. While a growing body of recent work has questioned the utility of Rawlsian ideal theory, the specific problems posed by race have still not been addressed.\(^4\) But racial justice is, almost by definition, a matter of non-ideal theory. This follows because races would not even exist in an ideal society. We would still have human beings of different skin colors, hair textures, and facial morphologies, but they would not constitute races. As argued in the opening section, race is socially constructed, and in the absence of racially discriminatory (non-ideal) social practices and institutions, race would never have come into existence in the first place. So the “whiteness” of ideal theory is manifest not merely in an epistemology that draws a curtain over the past and focuses instead on the depiction of an ideally just order that supposedly has the potential for addressing everybody’s concerns, transracially, but in its very metaphysics, in that a Rawlsian well-ordered society would be raceless. And even if racelessness can arguably constitute a normative target for us, an ideal to be aimed at, a society where race has been created and then dismantled through the appropriate public policy measures is not the moral equivalent of a society where race never came into existence in the first place. So the principles of justice
necessary for bringing about the former will in key respects be different from Rawlsian principles, since they will be predicated on the need to correct past oppression, whereas Rawls’s principles are not.

Racial justice should then be thought of as a concept for the realm of non-ideal theory, meant to complement rather than substitute for work such as Thomas Pogge’s moral targeting of past Western colonialism and imperialism, and present Western global institutional domination. \[44\] Racial justice is a heuristically useful category because, to a high degree, it tracks the legacy of the unfair global racial structure, established by colonialism and imperialism, white settlement and African slavery, that tendentially privileges whites globally, and that needs to be “repaired.” As Thomas McCarthy writes:

\[45\] Since the most developed countries are disproportionately former colonial powers, and the least developed are former colonies, the neoimperial system of domination and exploitation appears to be, in some considerable measure, a legacy of the five preceding centuries of colonialism and imperialism in their classical modern forms. If this is so, the present requirements of global justice include not only establishing relations of non-dominination and fair terms of exchange but also, and interdependently, repairing the harmful effects of past injustice. . . . Coming to terms with this past of racial and imperial injustice, and seeking to remedy the continuing harms that resulted from it are demands of reparative justice.

“Race,” in other words, tracks unfair advantage and disadvantage. Whites as a group have more wealth, more status, more political and cultural influence. This edge is not the result of differential innate ability, or a greater degree of industriousness, but is the outcome of several hundred years of transnational as well as intra-national (in the white settler states, for example) exploitation, manifest both in greater resources for whites as a racial group (which would advantage them in itself) and national and transnational structures which favor whites locally and the European and Euro-settler states globally. This is not a claim about individual racism, though
it would also be naïve to think we are living in a post-racial epoch. Rather, it is a claim about the social-systemic reproduction of unfair white advantage. Race cannot subsume other categories of justice because other metrics of social oppression exist also (class, gender). But neither is it the case that these other metrics can subsume race without theoretical residue, because of racial differentiation in the causal chains accounting for poverty among whites and nonwhites, distinct dimensions to racial injustice that are absent from class injustice, and a radically divergent history that violates the norms even of right-wing liberalism, thus making possible a normative strategy that need not rely on social-democratic values.

(ii) The conceptual shift from distributive to corrective justice, from the distributive norms of a well-ordered society to the rectificatory norms appropriate for an ill-ordered society, is thus crucial, and can, in my opinion, be seen as roughly the equivalent for race theory of the feminist challenge to the drawing of the public/private demarcation for gender theory. The key insight of second-wave feminism was that the way the private sphere was demarcated from the public sphere was theoretically pivotal, since gender justice as a normative issue was then conceptually obfuscated. Injustice happened in the public sphere, the state and the marketplace, not in the family and the household, which were beyond justice.\textsuperscript{46} Here the approximate homologue is the realization that what Rawls calls “compensatory justice” cannot, for race, be achieved within his conceptual framework, and that ideal theory, rather than providing the best theoretical foundation upon which to do non-ideal theory adequately, as Rawls claimed, actually obstructs its mission. So the very orientation towards ideal theory has not merely left these issues contingently unaddressed (that is, white philosophers have not as a matter of fact chosen to address them), but structurally unaddressable (that is, the apparatus itself is inimical to carrying out this normative agenda).
The introduction of racial justice as a theme and imperative in both the domestic and the
global justice literature would thus have the virtue of making clear that what is demanded is a
correction of past wrongs, thereby forcing on to the table an accounting of those wrongs.
Moreover, a reparative normative project has traditionally been seen as more urgent in ethical
type, since it is obligatory for all liberals to correct violations of negative rights, whereas
poverty relief is too easily pushed over the moral border into the realm of the supererogatory,
praiseworthy but not (for right-wing liberals) required of us. Rectificatory justice might thus
generate a higher degree of convergence between rival theoretical positions than distributive
justice—think of the huge differences between egalitarians, modified Rawlsians, libertarians,
adequacy theorists, and cosmopolitans on what the latter requires of us. As Daniel Butt points
out in his recent book, *Rectifying International Injustice*:

> It is hard to maintain that there is a great deal of real world support for redistributive
cosmopolitanism. . . . Given the apparent lack of public support for global egalitarianism
. . . it may well be that the best political strategy for those who support extensive
redistribution is not to seek to challenge the deeply held foundational principles of real
world political actors, but to maintain that these very principles, if properly understood,
call for a substantial [global] redistribution of resources. . . . [Accordingly, the] account
of harm given in this book . . . draws upon paradigm cases of unjust international
interaction.47

Insofar as even right-wing liberals presumably oppose (as good liberals) racism and unjust
enrichment, they should be able to agree that the victims of racial injustice deserve compensation
for the past. (Of course, the picture is more complicated than I am representing it here, since
there can be value-convergence across the spectrum of views on anti-discrimination principles,
but radical *factual* divergence on what that history is, and whether it can truly be claimed that the
situation of the less developed nations today, or of, say, blacks in the United States, results from
this history. The political right will have competing narratives of their own to offer.)
But apart from this strategic point, there is also, more importantly, a principled point. Simply put, justice, and morality in general, requires that moral actions be carried out under a certain description for them to have the appropriate identity. This is not, of course, peculiar to ethics but a general feature of all actions. In this context, the relevant point is that all redistribution is not the same. If I give you twenty dollars because I am feeling sorry for you, it is not the same as if I give you twenty dollars to repay the money I borrowed from you last month. In both cases, twenty dollars have gone from me to you, but the first is an act of charity while the second is the repayment of a debt. So the answer to the question of what the nature of the transaction is depends not merely on the (“objective”) material transfer of a twenty dollar bill between us but the (“subjective”/”intersubjective”) description under which it is carried out, and our respective understandings of what is going on.

More seriously, and on a global scale, if black Americans who are the descendants of slaves, or Australian aborigines suffering from their ancestors’ expropriation, or Third World peoples impoverished because of the colonization of their country were to receive a transfer of resources because government or international bodies have been won over by egalitarian arguments or a Rawlsian commitment to remedying the situation of the worst-off, they have arguably not gotten their due. For reparations to be made, for the wrong against them and their ancestors to be corrected—repaired, made good, rectified—what is required is not merely a physical transfer of resources but a transfer taking place under a description and on a normative foundation that make it a certain kind of action and not another kind of action. If the narrative that philosophers such as McCarthy and myself believe is roughly true (and obviously this is a hugely controversial and contested topic), then distributive justice approaches, Rawlsian or otherwise, are failing to target the actual wrong involved.
Relatedly, rectificatory justice, resting on a different normative justification than distributive justice, has additional prerequisites for it to be fully achieved. There are symbolic aspects to rectification—an official apology, moral condemnation of perpetrators, rewriting of governing narratives, memorialization—that simply do not arise if it is just a matter of redistributing assets and resources. The ideal of rectification is healing, and the recognition of the wrongs of the past as wrongs. If the wrong has involved the systematic denial of personhood to the group in question, as racial wrongs typically do, then correction requires that this denial be retracted through a reaffirmation of racial personhood (or an affirmation, if personhood was never conceded in the first place). Moreover, this applies not just to the living but the dead also. The dead cannot be brought back, but one can choose to respect or continue to disrespect them. This is, of course, one of the central aims of memorialization, which justified the postwar creation of Holocaust Memorial Museums. But the question to be asked is: where are the memorials for all of Europe’s other dead? The Third Reich is universally condemned, but what about the Weiss Reich? Where are the memorials for Spain’s Native Americans, or the Belgian Congolese, or Germany’s Nama and Hereros, or Italy’s Ethiopians and Libyans, or Britain’s Kikuyu, or France’s Algerians, or the Atlantic Slave Trade’s millions? What is required is a global Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would bring to light these suppressed histories, and pay the appropriate respect to this huge unmarked and unacknowledged nonwhite necropolis.

4. Conclusion

I want to close by returning to the issue raised at the start of this essay. Against this background, we should now better be able to appreciate Sun Yat-sen’s wariness about what could be termed a premature cosmopolitanism, and understand why a racially informed
cosmopolitanism is neither a contradiction in terms nor incompatible with liberal universalism. In the final chapter of her book on Du Bois, *Democracy’s Reconstruction*, Lawrie Balfour warns that in “a modern world order begotten through racial slavery and colonial conquest,” a putatively color-blind and race-transcendent cosmopolitanism is likely to be bogus, evading rather than confronting “the racialized forms of power that have defined modern experience.”  

In the context of the times—and even today, nearly a century later—the cosmopolitanism being excoriated by Sun Yat-sen was, I would suggest, the global conceptual equivalent of the “color-blindness” and “post-raciality” now hegemonic among the white population in the United States—a verbal-rather-than-substantive-dissolving of continuing hierarchies of white racial privilege in a spuriously attractive ideal that, by its failure to name, confront, and address the past will only guarantee its perpetuation. Race can only be transcended by facing and working through it, not by evading and pretending to have sublated it. A liberalism and a cosmopolitanism that fail to deal with race will continue to be a racial liberalism and cosmopolitanism, incapable of prescribing the measures of rectificatory racial justice necessary not just for dismantling the long-established structures of racial domination, but also for transforming white moral psychology and consciousness, thereby laying the foundations for a new, genuinely post-racial world.

NOTES

1 This paper has now been published in Barbara Buckinx, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, and Timothy Waligore, eds., *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, and Institutional Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2015).


4 Sun Yat-sen, “San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People),” selections from Lecture 4, trans. Frank W. Price [1927], excerpted in Prasenjit Duara, ed., *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (New York:
Nonetheless, even inferior ones. In other words, “whiteness” in the period was not a monolith but itself a hierarchically structured category.

Guglielmo has argued that the “ethnic” European immigrants (Jews, Irish, Italians) some have claimed to be. See Paul Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2013).


However, with specific reference to the United States, though perhaps with more general applicability, Thomas Guglielmo has argued that the “ethnic” European immigrants (Jews, Irish, Italians) some have claimed to be originally (late 19th century/early 20th century) nonwhite in the U.S. were actually categorized as whites, but inferior ones. In other words, “whiteness” in the period was not a monolith but itself a hierarchically structured category. Nonetheless, even inferior whites were superior to people of color. Guglielmo, White On Arrival.


Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the


27 Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” in Gruffydd Jones, Decolonizing, p. 89.


37 Borstelmann, Cold War, p. 46.


44 See, for example, Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2008).

45 McCarthy, Race, Empire, pp. 4, 17.

46 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family.
